It is easy to dismiss the 15-point plan published by the “Peace Council.” A year of exhausting negotiations has so far produced mostly glossy declarations: a new Gaza, free of Hamas rule, with all weapons placed under the control of a technocratic government. The key question remains unanswered: what comes first — an Israeli withdrawal, or Hamas disarming? According to the plan, a timetable for implementing this vision is now supposed to be set. Within 14 days. Unfortunately, that is unlikely to happen.
There is also a small practical component to the document. The Peace Council is demanding that the Israeli government resume implementing the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement: stop the targeted killings and bombing, and allow in the quantities of humanitarian aid to which we committed.
We have seen all kinds of Israeli responses to international diplomatic initiatives: “yes,” “no,” “yes, but.” We have never seen a response like this one: complete disregard, as though this were an agreement between Greek and Turkish Cyprus. Israel is involved in the negotiations themselves, but “political sources” are anonymously tearing the plan apart. And most importantly, a year after the ceasefire, the IDF found five Hamas weapons depots to bomb the day before yesterday. Five!
For an Israeli public suffering from severe post-traumatic stress, it is difficult to accept any kind of solution. That is why it is almost impossible to convey the elements that actually exist in this document. But Israelis should know that Hamas has agreed for all heavy weapons to be taken away and placed under the control of the technocratic government. Its members may continue to work in the public sector — as teachers and civil servants — but not automatically. Those who are rejected will retire and receive pensions. Hamas members will not be allowed to serve in the Palestinian police force in Gaza. This is supposed to prevent Hamas from simply operating under the guise of a police force.
Of course, one can doubt every word. Here come the naïve Americans again — what do they understand? Hamas will manipulate everything and control the Strip through puppet governments. Perhaps. But it is worth remembering a few things.
First, the international community stands behind the plan. Being the only party to sabotage it would put us in direct confrontation with the United States as well.
Second, what risk is Israel actually taking by adopting the plan? In any case, this is supposed to be a gradual withdrawal, dependent on Hamas fulfilling its commitments. Suppose Israel withdraws somewhat, initially retaining “only” 50% of the Gaza Strip, and gives the disarmament process a chance. What is the risk? Other than burying the delusions of the Southern Command chief about “defeating Hamas,” we have nothing to lose. If it works, we have “lost” 10% of the Strip — territory we have no need or interest in holding in the first place. And if it fails, we can always return to our original positions.
The Israeli public is repeatedly exposed to reports about Hamas rebuilding, rearming, recruiting fighters, and accumulating weapons. Those reports should be treated with some skepticism. Its military wing is certainly trying to reorganize and strengthen itself, but the real picture is that Hamas is battered, weak, unpopular, struggling to pay salaries, and prepared to make unprecedented concessions. The path to dismantling what remains of Hamas probably does not run through yet another bombing campaign or another targeted killing. It runs through creating an alternative governing authority in the form of the technocratic government, a multinational force in the Strip, and an influx of international funding.
Only someone who is still fantasizing about emptying the Strip of its residents and sending them to Somaliland could oppose such a plan.
The opposition leaders responded to the new plan with relative moderation. Avigdor Lieberman, naturally, attacked it furiously. Gadi Eisenkot offered general criticism, but the overall tone was restrained. Perhaps this foreshadows the approach a future change government would take, if one is formed.
If there were any chance that Netanyahu’s government would go along with the plan, that chance is clearly shrinking with less than three months to go before the election. Still, it is good that the plan was published. Perhaps it will succeed in preventing Netanyahu from starting yet another war in the Gaza Strip before the election.