The U.S. rescue operation was heroic, but we should not draw the wrong conclusion from it. The capabilities of the U.S. military are not what Israel imagined. Its potential capabilities are extraordinary—the heavy bombs, the aircraft carriers, everything is there—but it lacks the command structure and planning necessary to produce meaningful results. It is no coincidence that most of the major achievements in the war are the result of Israeli Air Force strikes.
The disappointment with U.S. command is nothing compared with the shock at the lack of strategic planning. Donald Trump admitted that he thought the war would last three days and was surprised by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian attacks on the Gulf states. These "surprises" were so unsurprising that it is unclear where the U.S. military leadership was. In recent decades, there has not been a U.S. war game that did not include these possibilities. Instead of building a European-Gulf coalition to prepare for them, Trump bombed, and then was stunned to discover that he had no idea how to deal with the immediate consequences.
It turns out that when you assemble an administration of "yes-men," opportunists, and flatterers—often incompetent ones—whose only criterion for being accepted is absolute loyalty, this is the result. To be clear, the above refers to the Trump administration, but Israel is heading in the same direction; it can already be seen, unfortunately even within the military. And the sharpest and most painful expression of this is currently taking place on the northern front.
The IDF was not prepared for a campaign in the north. It had objectives, but no strategic plan for how the use of force would improve security. In recent days, the IDF leadership has gained a little confidence and admitted that there is no military way to dismantle Hezbollah. Even that was done in a roundabout manner. "A senior military official" briefed the press.
What the IDF is doing also carries risks, and it appears that there is no serious discussion of those risks within the political and security leadership. The defense minister talks about holding the territory up to the Litani. The IDF claims it will not build permanent outposts. If so, how exactly will Israel control the territory? How many forces will it require, and does it have them? The IDF says it will not allow the population to return to villages in the south until Hezbollah is disarmed. And what will be done to those who try to return? The IDF is destroying Shiite villages near the border. The fact that many of the buildings there were used as weapons depots makes them legitimate targets, but does Israel intend for the villages never to be rebuilt? Is this going to be a permanent occupation? International attention to the issue is limited at the moment, but that could change.
Benjamin Netanyahu may hope that he can leverage the pressure to obtain an agreement that includes the disarmament of Hezbollah, but there is a risk that by the time that day comes, the Lebanese government will have weakened even further, reducing the chances that it will be able to confront Hezbollah. Worse, the bleeding on our side will continue, soldiers will be killed, and Hezbollah will return to its position of comfort—as Lebanon's defender against Israeli occupation, the only terrorist organization that ever forced Israel to withdraw under fire.
In general, thanks to Israel, the Hezbollah that was battered in October 2024 is now showing signs of life. It has abandoned the fantasy of confronting the IDF army-to-army and returned to its position as a guerrilla organization, seeking to shed blood, survive, and continue disrupting everyday life in northern Israel. Meanwhile, the IDF is managing to maneuver in southern Lebanon with an operational freedom that could only have been imagined during the Second Lebanon War.
Hezbollah has managed to paralyze the north of the country for longer than the Second Lebanon War itself lasted. In 2006, it was said that the war had failed because it lasted too long. Thirty-four days. Now, the paralysis of an entire country for 38 days—and there is still no end in sight—is apparently a deluxe war.