If the ceasefire becomes permanent, the war was unnecessary and it was a mistake to start it. It is important to say this, because the public’s mechanisms of denial make it difficult to accept the fact that after sacrificing so much, it was all for nothing.
Quite a few commentators are now arguing that the war was justified, that Israel weakened Iran. True, it lasted a little too long and the ultimate objectives were not achieved, but weakening Iran and demonstrating Israel’s capabilities also have value. Well, there is no doubt that Iran was weakened, and there is no doubt that Israeli deterrence has been strengthened. These things have value and importance, but their benefits are smaller than the significant damage caused.
For 30 years, Israel has argued that Iran would abandon its nuclear ambitions only when faced with a credible military threat. Over the past 20 years, compelling evidence has also been added to this argument. The only time Iran actually halted its nuclear program was in 2003, after the United States invaded Iraq and Iran feared it would be next.
Well, this time the threat was credible. This time the threat was also carried out. The scenario Israel had so desperately hoped for finally happened: a joint Israeli-American attack, the nightmare the Iranians had feared so much.
At the end of this campaign — assuming it does not resume — Iran remains standing, the enriched uranium is still on its territory, and it is not obligated to remove it or stop enrichment. What will prevent it this time from making the leap to a nuclear bomb? The Iranians surely assume that if the American president, Donald Trump, ends the war now, the chances that he will be dragged into another attack on Iran are close to zero. At most, there will be another Israeli strike — which, from the Iranian perspective, should not eliminate the enormous incentive to obtain a bomb, while greatly reducing the likelihood that anyone will dare bomb them again.
Benjamin Netanyahu did find an American president whom he could persuade to attack Iran, but he knew exactly who Trump was and who the people around him were. Netanyahu surely knew that there was no deep strategic thinking there about how to prevent the Iranians from disrupting the global economy. The superpower has never had a weaker team. Retrospective reports about the latest negotiations held in Oman between the president’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, and the Iranian team showed that Witkoff did not really understand what the Iranians were telling him, where they had made concessions, or what they were standing firm on.
Could Netanyahu have gotten the Americans to plan this war more carefully? Perhaps not. That is part of the nature of this administration, and it was precisely what allowed him to bring it into such a war. But there was one thing Netanyahu could have done: make an effort to persuade Trump to end the war sooner. After Ali Khamenei was killed and most of the high-value targets had been attacked, it would have been possible to try to leave, before the disruptions to the energy market. That way, Iran’s survival achievement would have seemed less significant, and the economic damage to Israel and the Gulf states would have been far less dramatic.
It appears that Trump wants to end the war, but Iran is digging in on positions that are “humiliating” for him, making it difficult for him to do so. Therefore, for now, he has chosen a naval blockade — flexing his muscles without bombing. If his goal was to calm the international energy market, this is more or less the worst possible move.
After 40 days of bombing by two of the world’s most powerful militaries, Iran’s weakened and battered regime does not even agree to return to the status quo that existed before February 28: the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping and no payment of compensation.
And that may be the best answer to the question of who feels they won the war.
All that remains is to hope that perhaps the masses in Iran will take to the streets and save the situation.