It was refreshing to see the prime minister and defense minister describe a diplomatic agreement that includes an Israeli withdrawal from two areas in Lebanon as a tremendous achievement. Netanyahu was and remains a master of political marketing: he makes a 180-degree change in policy and presents it as a victory. He has no reasonable explanation for why it took him three and a half months to reach this agreement. And what exactly did we achieve during those months, in which dozens of our soldiers were killed, enormous sums were spent on reserve duty, and the routine that had only just begun to take shape in the north was once again destroyed?
As a reminder, we entered this war after Hezbollah launched a pathetic attack — the most minor response it could come up with to the killing of Ali Khamenei. From the very first day of the war, the Lebanese president pleaded with us to reach an agreement with him. He made unprecedentedly strong statements against Hezbollah and made clear that the Lebanese Army should be the only armed force in the country.
Israel's response to these extraordinary statements was force, and more force. Netanyahu, Katz, and unfortunately also the military leadership spoke about disarming Hezbollah, about occupation, and about establishing an especially wide security zone, while rejecting the Lebanese president's outstretched hand.
On the surface, perhaps that is not so terrible. In the end, we signed an agreement, and along the way we killed more Hezbollah operatives, dismantled infrastructure, and obtained an agreement in which the Lebanese government recognizes the legitimacy of our remaining in a security zone until Hezbollah is disarmed.
In reality, however, there is only one criterion by which to determine whether this entire war was worth it: Is the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army stronger or weaker as a result? And is Hezbollah stronger or weaker?
Hezbollah has demonstrated that it is no longer the defeated organization it was in October 2024. It is still dealing with serious problems — questions of legitimacy both in Lebanon as a whole and within its Shiite community, not to mention severe economic problems — but it remains a force capable of rebuilding the successes it achieved during the previous security-zone era and continuing to attack communities in northern Israel. It can even attempt to infiltrate northern communities despite the heavy IDF presence.
At the same time, the alternative to Hezbollah has been weakened. It is difficult to see how the Lebanese government, in its desperate economic condition, can strengthen its poorly equipped army. The government needs to help a million displaced people return to their homes, and in many cases there are no homes left. Roads and infrastructure have to be rebuilt, while there is little indication that the international community is eager to pour money into Lebanon.
What are the chances that the Lebanese Army will succeed in establishing effective control over areas in southern Lebanon? And that its forces will confront Hezbollah's attempts to reestablish itself there? And what will we do when we realize that this is not happening? Will we remain in large areas of southern Lebanon?
The real achievement of the agreement is that we have brought the United States onto our side regarding the question of a complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Iran will continue to argue that its agreement with the United States is conditional on our complete withdrawal from the territory, but the United States has signed the opposite agreement.
There is no point exaggerating the achievement. The Americans had already said this before the agreement, including the president himself. Nevertheless, in the face of the international community, we now have a signed document. There is justification for that, and that's good. But the major dilemma remains: Is it wise to stay in southern Lebanon?
The bottom line is very similar to the reality before the agreement. There is no real logic to this security zone. It will not prevent Hezbollah from firing on northern communities if it decides to do so. It gives Hezbollah a justification for attacking IDF soldiers. It does not strengthen the Lebanese Army, and it stretches the IDF's forces — which are already stretched beyond their capabilities.
It would be better to declare the pilot successful as quickly as possible and proceed at an accelerated pace with further withdrawals, until reaching a narrow strip intended to thwart the most frightening threat of all: a ground infiltration into northern Israeli communities.