There is no certainty that the Prime Minister even wants to end this. It’s quite clear that he doesn’t. But for the sake of the intellectual exercise: how can the war be ended?
Hezbollah presents two main challenges. With future missile build-up deep inside Lebanon, it will be harder to deal with. Avigdor Lieberman stated that Israel’s security doctrine should not allow such build-up, but did not specify how. Naftali Bennett, in an interview with an American channel (he also now only gives interviews to foreign channels), set the elimination of Hezbollah (and along the way also Hamas and Iran) as the war’s objective. Their game is transparent: they’re doing to Benjamin Netanyahu what he has done to every prime minister before him — setting acceptable but impossible goals. Politically clever, cynical, and dangerous for the public.
Israel has already bombed arms convoys, facilities, and infrastructure, trying to stop the build-up process. This did not prevent Hezbollah from maintaining an astonishing quantity of missiles. The real solution to the challenge lies in strengthening the Lebanese state, so it can disarm Hezbollah. But Lebanon is weaker than ever, and Israel’s ability to influence such a political process is practically zero.
The more practical challenge is pushing Hezbollah’s ground forces and anti-tank missile threats away from the border and out of range of northern Israeli residents. Assuming—and hoping—that no one truly longs for a permanent Israeli presence in the security zone or dreams of establishing a South Lebanon Army, there is only one way. A weak way, almost frightening, and likely to struggle to gain public trust, but the only way: an international force backing the Lebanese army.
Despite justified doubts and bad experiences with these forces, is there a way to build a more effective force? If only 20% of the money, time, courage, and creativity invested in locating Nasrallah and assassinating him had been invested in this thought.
After the Second Lebanon War, the option of deploying a NATO “intervention force” in southern Lebanon was floated. Then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was enthusiastic. It ended with an upgraded UNIFIL mandate, combining French and Italian forces (the French gave up quite quickly). It lasted a relatively short time and deteriorated into a situation where Hezbollah acted in southern Lebanon as if it was its own backyard.
Nevertheless, it’s possible to try to leverage the international community’s justified fears of a Gog and Magog war to build something more substantial. The Americans will not send soldiers but, certainly a month before elections, are interested in rallying a more effective coalition. They could draft a Security Council resolution granting a broader mandate to the new force, especially regarding the use of firepower. They could also help arm, train, and equip the Lebanese army.
Technological means could also be considered to help provide the world with a reliable picture of what’s happening on the ground. Israel could demand a special border regime in the contact zones. In open areas, at least demand distancing from the fence and creating a killing zone. Lebanese villages near the fence will not be evacuated, but there are ways to try to make Hezbollah’s return to the area more difficult.
It is also clear that Israel will need to be far more willing to use force, even in routine times, if there is clear evidence that Hezbollah is returning on the ground.
How long will this hold? Political solutions last longer, but the calm in the north after the Second Lebanon War was maintained, with minor exceptions, for about 17 years. Hopefully, this will be the outcome of this war.
Unfortunately, this is just an intellectual amusement. The chances that Netanyahu will push to end the war at this peak moment are quite low.