During the last coalition negotiations, a journalist from Maariv wanted to understand one of Otzma Yehudit’s demands concerning land. One of Itamar Ben-Gvir’s spokespeople directed her to an authority on the subject who was apparently behind the demands. The referral to that authority caused an uproar in Ben-Gvir and his associates’ WhatsApp group.
“Why are you sending someone to our source?” one person angrily asked. “Rogin [the name of that authority], who helped us wholeheartedly, is angry with me. We exposed him to the media.” Ben-Gvir was furious: “Are you guys serious? This is madness. That’s not how you operate.”
Back then, at the beginning, Ben-Gvir and his people still had relatively few sources. Since then, he has used this method to dismantle the police: maintaining direct contact with police officers and prison guards at every rank, including junior personnel. In doing so, he undermines the entire system of appointments within the police and the Prison Service, making it clear to every officer that the path to promotion runs through a warm, direct relationship with the minister.
This method diminishes the police commissioner and the other commanders, and raises a dramatic question: The day after Ben-Gvir, when there is a different government and a sane minister of internal security — what should be done with those officers who cast aside all the rules that bind them and turned themselves into Ben-Gvir’s servants? What should be done with the senior officials among them? Take, for example, Shai District Commander Moshe Pinchi, who never imagined he would reach the positions he has reached and is there only for all the wrong reasons.
Or Avinoam Emunah, now commander of the Hasmonean Brigade, who met with Ben-Gvir behind the IDF chief of staff’s back in order to be appointed commander of the National Guard? Ben-Gvir deliberately held the meeting in secret, fully understanding that the secrecy gave him leverage over the officer, whose secret was now in his hands. When the meeting was leaked, Ben-Gvir was furious once again. “The commissioner is burning down the club,” he wrote to his associates, assuming that the commissioner had leaked the story.
When the Change Government came to power, I thought it should focus on legislating agreed-upon rules of the game, such as a Basic Law: Legislation, to ensure that a return by Benjamin Netanyahu could not once again undermine the entire structure of our democracy. That did not happen. The government was too fragile, with too narrow a majority to attempt to pass legislation that ambitious.
If Netanyahu loses the election this time, things should be handled differently. Everyone who blatantly cooperated with this government, everyone who betrayed the responsibilities of their position, should be removed en masse. This course of action seemingly carries a risk: it would open the door, if power were to change hands again, to a much broader purge. But in any case, the next time someone like Netanyahu heads such a coalition, they will begin their term much more aggressively.
There is no need to be afraid. Law-enforcement agencies and the civil service must be restored quickly. We should, in a sense, call up all the worthy senior officials who are currently outside government and bring them back into the public sector. Do not wait. Do not try to craft monumental legislation that would address every loophole in our fragile democratic structure, which Netanyahu has exploited in recent years.
On the face of it, this entire discussion is a luxury. There is still a long time until the election, and there is no certainty that Netanyahu will lose. But this discussion should also influence the way the opposition conducts itself today. The current opposition leaders have been fairly quiet regarding the appointment of David Zini as head of the Shin Bet. Most of them oppose it, but quietly. Perhaps they are thinking about future cooperation with him.
That is not the way. They need to make it clear: If you behave like a biased Shin Bet chief and do the government’s bidding rather than serving the state, your tenure will be very short. We will not hesitate to replace you the moment we come to power. Only a message this forceful might persuade Zini to behave like a statesmanlike, institutional Shin Bet chief.