If indeed all the hostages are released in the coming days, it will be a major achievement for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — the closest thing to a Hamas surrender that will remain without an insurance policy. Netanyahu will, after all, be able to return to the war once the hostages have been released, as he apparently wants to do.
A deal to end the war in exchange for the release of all the hostages has been on the table since the first day of the war. Even more so, it was at the heart of Phase Two of the previous deal. It is fair to argue that Netanyahu could have reached a similar deal in the past, and still, the current deal is a major achievement for him.
From the outset, this was an asymmetric deal. The release of the hostages is a tangible, irreversible concession that Hamas is required to make. Israel’s concession, by contrast — ending the war — is a declaration that can immediately be watered down afterward. That has already happened: Netanyahu refused dozens of times to end the war, culminating in the most cynical step of all: his refusal, eight months ago, even to negotiate Phase Two.
Hamas understood the problem with the deal. Who would stop Israel if Netanyahu found a pretext to resume the fighting after the hostages had been released? Trump? Qatar? That is why Hamas always insisted on a longer timeline for the release of the hostages, one that would allow Gazan civilians to return to their homes, enable a massive influx of humanitarian aid, and bring about an almost complete IDF withdrawal.
Netanyahu identified the real difference between the deals of the past and the current one: the rapid release of the hostages despite the fact that the IDF withdrawal is far from complete. Trump did manage to extract a concession from Netanyahu on the issue of withdrawal — in the original plan, there was to be no IDF withdrawal at all until the hostages were released; in reality, there had already been a small withdrawal, which expanded after Trump published a map — but it is still far from Hamas’s previous demands.
Fundamentally, it was an act of extraordinary cruelty not to reach a similar agreement long ago. During that time, Israel became an international pariah, dozens of soldiers were killed, hundreds were wounded, not to mention what happened to the hostages. In any case, the lines at which the IDF will ultimately be positioned are no longer all that strategically significant. Moving back from the perimeter to a siege of Gaza City is a military task that would take only a few days.
President Trump published a plan full of holes and impossible to implement, but once again demonstrated that he has strong public-relations instincts. He took Hamas’s polite “no” to the ultimatum he had issued and presented it as a “yes.” In doing so, he created momentum for international pressure on both sides to end the war.
Hamas found itself in a difficult position: on the one hand, it cannot agree to a surrender plan; on the other, it is difficult to derail it. A demand for the release of particularly problematic security prisoners, among the 250 prisoners serving life sentences who are supposed to be released, could perhaps provide a solution for Hamas. What will Netanyahu do if Hamas demands the release of Marwan Barghouti or the architects of the Second Intifada’s terrorism?
Both sides understand that, at best, everything in Trump’s plan beyond Phase One is written on ice. The involvement of a “renewed” Palestinian Authority and the vision of a Palestinian state — these are empty words. Netanyahu’s supporters never really believed he intended to establish a Palestinian state during the decade in which he talked about it, and they will not demand a price from him now.
At the end of May 2024, President Joe Biden presented a plan to end the war and release all the hostages, with Netanyahu’s approval. Hamas took its time and, in early July, said “yes, but.” Even then, it was under enormous international pressure, including from Qatar and Egypt. Netanyahu then watered it down. Will Trump know how to maintain pressure on the parties? It is hard to believe. More importantly: Will Trump still be there after Phase One to prevent Netanyahu from resuming the war? He will probably have lost interest by then. That is what Netanyahu is counting on.