So how did he do it? The late Henry Kissinger wrote a book about every negotiation he took part in. Donald Trump is the furthest thing from Kissinger, yet he produced a remarkable result in a remarkably short time.
It began with the publication of an Israeli dream plan, a document reminiscent of the “Deal of the Century”: everything Netanyahu had dreamed of, along with a few empty declarations about a Palestinian Authority and a Palestinian state that will never come to pass. Netanyahu happily climbed aboard. Then came the next stage: the release of the hostages was initially supposed to take place within 48 hours, with no withdrawal whatsoever. That became 72 hours, followed by a symbolic withdrawal.
At the same time, Trump skillfully created unprecedented Arab pressure. The tangle of his personal, economic, political, and military ties with Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt placed Hamas under impossible pressure. Hamas tried to push back and gave an answer that was partly “yes” and partly “no.” In a brilliant move, Trump decided that this was a positive answer.
The next clever move was to create a physical pressure cooker in Egypt, with an artificial deadline — childish but effective: Friday, the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize winner.
Once all the major key players arrived in Sharm el-Sheikh, Hamas representatives could hardly leave with a “no.” The Qataris and Turks made it clear to them that, from their perspective, this was the end of the road, and that they could not do this to Trump. On the other hand, they offered carrots: once you agree, we will help rebuild you.
Hamas representatives did not have much faith in Trump’s promises, but the Qatari-Turkish card was stronger than ever. Look what we managed to get out of Trump, they said. Look how he brought Netanyahu to his knees and forced him to apologize to us. We also got a presidential order from him for a kind of defense pact. At the same time, the Americans extracted concessions from Netanyahu regarding the withdrawal, which leaves most of the population centers in the Strip under Hamas control. The plan is still pro-Israeli, but Netanyahu, too, found himself in a position in which he could no longer refuse the president.
Trump’s final maneuver was an astonishing lesson in American power. While the sides were arguing over the list of prisoners, he announced that there was a deal. Hamas grumbled and fumed, but had no choice but to go along. Meanwhile, the Arab states capitalized on the president’s appetite for public relations, getting him to inflate the interim agreement — a mere one-page document — into “peace in the Middle East,” including a peace conference in Sharm el-Sheikh.
Hamas wanted strong commitments all the way through that “end of the war” really meant the end. Netanyahu wanted the option of resuming the war after the hostages were released. As far as the agreement itself is concerned, nothing prevents Netanyahu from doing so, but it is clear that the spectacle of the past few days will make it harder for him to generate legitimacy for another massive Israeli military operation in the Strip.
In general, Netanyahu deserves no credit for the release of the hostages. Over the past two years, he rejected every deal that would have ended the war in exchange for the return of the hostages. He was the one who invented the model of phased releases and partial deals as a way to evade such an agreement. He walked away from such negotiations in February-March of this year and went all-in on the Witkoff framework for a partial deal. The achievements in the current deal that he is now trumpeting are real, but what exactly do they give us? In any case, taking control of territory in the Strip had already become a relatively easy military challenge. This achievement is nowhere near worth the price paid by the soldiers who were killed and wounded, the Palestinians who were harmed despite not being Hamas members, the enormous damage to Israel’s international standing, and the suffering of the hostages.
Netanyahu will say: But this deal does not prevent me from resuming the war if Hamas violates it. One should tell him: That is what you were told dozens of times throughout the war. As Amos Hochstein, the American mediator, once put it: In this region, there is never a shortage of reasons to start a war.