In closed-door conversations, Naftali Bennett describes a meticulous preparations process for the election. A new campaign chief, a fundraising operation, the construction of a grassroots network, and, most importantly, the establishment of a lengthy and thorough process for selecting candidates for the party list. No more Amichai Shikli and Idit Silman. Bennett is devoting most of his energy to an intensive courtship of Gadi Eisenkot.
Bennett’s theory is that it is critical to quickly establish a political picture of a two-way race: Benjamin Netanyahu versus Bennett. In the Bennett camp, they argue that those precious few Netanyahu-supporting mandates will not leave as long as it appears that he has no replacement; regardless of how much political commentators talk about blocs, as long as Netanyahu appears at the top of the largest column in the polls, his standing both around the world and among those voters remains that of the only person capable of leading.
According to Bennett, the remedy is for Eisenkot to join forces with him. This would not increase the number of seats in the bloc opposing Netanyahu, but it would put Bennett head-to-head against Netanyahu. Only then, they believe, would those additional mandates come in and guarantee 61 seats for a coalition of change, without the Arab parties.
Much of Bennett’s courtship of Eisenkot is also related to the fact that, according to Bennett’s internal polling, the overlap between their constituencies is much greater than it would be with Avigdor Lieberman. Bennett and Lieberman were once bitter rivals, and they made harsh statements about each other. Today, things are completely different, but Lieberman still excludes the ultra-Orthodox, while Bennett maintains ties with them. Some of Lieberman’s voters have difficulty with Bennett’s religious identity, and vice versa. Not optimal.
Is Bennett right? It is difficult to know. When Netanyahu was previously removed from power, there was no head-to-head contest. But Bennett’s interest is obvious: if he is not a viable alternative for government, he could slide into an embarrassing single-digit number of seats. Bennett’s base is not made up of people who are crazy about him; they are right-wing voters who believe he is a reasonable alternative to Netanyahu.
One thing is certain: Eisenkot joining Bennett as number two, with no rotation agreement, would destroy the possibility that, after these terrible years, a prime minister who is not right-wing on diplomatic and political matters will be elected. Bennett has proved that he has no difficulty leading a liberal coalition; he is already far removed from the Bennett of “To defeat Hamas, the IDF must be freed from the High Court of Justice.” Perhaps he was never really there, but he still struggles to issue a clear statement explaining what he does and does not support.
In theory, Eisenkot could already have emerged as the center-left candidate for prime minister. Unfortunately, after the courageous step he took in leaving Benny Gantz, he returned to behaving like Eisenkot: serious, deliberate, measured, and very far from doing what is necessary to win a political contest. If Eisenkot had joined forces with Yair Lapid, brought in outside forces, people with connections to the protest movement and reservists, he might have begun to approach 20 seats and forced Gantz to withdraw.
Contrary to the prevailing view in current political coverage — the claim that if the current polls materialize, neither bloc will be able to form a government is incorrect. The common argument is that if the parties opposed to Netanyahu do not have 61 seats, they will not dare rely on seats held by the Arab parties to swear in a government. I disagree. The Arab parties do not need to join the coalition. All that is required is for them to declare that they will boycott both blocs and abstain from votes concerning the formation of a government, the budget, and so on. A boycott.
Netanyahu and his allies will shout that this is effectively a government being sworn in with the votes of Ahmad Tibi and Mansour Abbas. Bennett, Eisenkot, Lapid, and Lieberman will live with that. They will commit to trying to broaden the government, but explain that Israel urgently needs a new, functioning government, and they will swear one in.