Here is an imaginary scenario: Benjamin Netanyahu announces his intention to open diplomatic negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, with a willingness to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state at the end of the process. Both sides acknowledge that this will be a long process requiring confidence-building, but they set out on the path.
The mouthpieces will presumably go a little wild, but Netanyahu knows how to rein them in. Trump asked for it; if we are talking to Jolani’s regime in Syria, there is no reason not to talk to the Palestinian Authority; in any case, we have no intention of actually establishing a state, so what’s the problem with talking? And above all: this somewhat hollow declaration would very likely bring us normalization with Saudi Arabia, followed by many of the other Arab states.
How did we reach a situation in which such a demand is not even part of the public discourse? Israel and Saudi Arabia are now on the same side of the divide, fighting the same enemy, closer than ever. Why not do it, apart from narrow and irrelevant political considerations, especially with elections approaching?
Not only for Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu has always liked to focus on the Iranian threat. It is big, existential, a confrontation with a regional empire, Churchillian, suited to the concepts with which he sees himself. But the number of casualties Iran has caused us in all the various rounds is lower than those caused in a single day during the bloody intifada of the early 2000s by Palestinian terrorist organizations. It is absurd to compare the levels of threat posed by Hezbollah and Iran with those posed by the Palestinians, certainly after October 7, and yet most of our diplomatic and security energy continues to be directed toward the Shiite axis rather than toward what is happening here, close to home.
Does diplomatic negotiation with the Palestinian Authority reduce the threat of Palestinian terrorism? Everyone in the public already has a firmly established opinion. In my view, clearly yes. Pursuing only a path of force leads to disasters like October 7. The Palestinian Authority today is weak, corrupt, and unpopular. Even in its weakened state, its security forces cooperate with ours. Under heavy European pressure, the PA is also trying to make changes that will restore its relevance. It has stopped paying money to the families of terrorists and instead established a broader welfare mechanism. Europeans believe this is progress; Israel still claims it is essentially an “Israeli bluff.”
The Palestinian Authority also claims that it is changing parts of its school curriculum and removing incitement. There is disagreement about that as well, but it shows that there is something to work with — if only someone in Israel would want to do something other than assassinations, bombings, and calls for the public to participate in the war effort by spending endless time in bomb shelters.
Expectations from Netanyahu are not high, to put it mildly, but even the leaders of the center-left do not dare to present this path. Yes, the PA is unpopular; an overwhelming majority of the Israeli public, including center-left voters, does not want to hear the words “Palestinian state.” But that is the essence of leadership. I have no doubt that Yair Lapid, Gadi Eisenkot, and Yair Golan believe this is the right path. They must find a way to persuade the public of that, and point to an alternative to the leadership that has brought upon us perhaps the worst three years in the country’s history.
For now, Lapid is once again trying to challenge Netanyahu from the right. He is demanding a broader bombing campaign against Iran’s energy facilities (which even prompted an angry response from Iranian regime opponents). It is hard to believe anyone will buy this; it is difficult to imagine a single voter saying: if Lapid had been in charge of the campaign, we would have brought down the ayatollahs’ regime. There is no point pretending.