A few minutes before I went into the studio on June 12, 2025, a well-meaning soul tried to dissuade me from arguing in my article, which was supposed to be published the next day, that there was no chance Israel would attack Iran. I did, in fact, add to my piece the line that the information reaching me indicated that the pilots were already about to take off to bomb, but I left in the bottom line—the stupid one. There was no chance, I wrote, that if there were still any common sense among our leaders, they would attack Iran. Eight hours later, Israel attacked, and I learned firsthand the power of a preconceived notion.
My assumption was that Israel would not attack without American approval, that there was no logic to it, and that we would not succeed in seriously damaging Iran's nuclear or ballistic-missile programs without the Americans. I did not understand that Donald Trump is a president unlike anything we have ever seen. With Trump, it turns out, there isn't simply a green light or a red light for an operation; there is also "red, unless it succeeds." And as we saw in the attack in Qatar and on the Iranian-Qatari oil field—"green, unless it fails."
Even on the evening of the attack, Trump said he opposed military action, which did not prevent him from joining the operation once it appeared to have succeeded.
My assessment was wrong by 180 degrees, but the logic behind it was actually vindicated by the war. It took quite some time to dispel all the propaganda lies of Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, which were unfortunately backed by American and Israeli military statements, but today it is clear to everyone that the nuclear program has not been significantly set back, nor has the ballistic-missile program.
Trump's new excuse for the attack this time was that everything had been rebuilt during the eight months since the 12-day war. That doesn't hold water. Even Tulsi Gabbard, the head of U.S. intelligence, an ardent Trump supporter willing to sell the integrity of American intelligence rather than upset the president, admitted in the latest briefing that the intelligence community is unaware of any Iranian attempt to rebuild its nuclear program after the 12-day war.
Therefore, the big question is why the war is continuing at all. Both governments are already openly admitting that the chances of the war immediately bringing about regime change in Iran are slim. Nor does a heroic military operation to recover the 440 kilograms of enriched uranium, apparently buried at three sites, seem realistic. So what is the point of continuing the war? How did its objective suddenly become opening the Strait of Hormuz? Or taking control of Kharg Island?
It is also difficult to understand how time is working in Israel's favor. Is what we achieve with one more bombing, one more assassination, worth paralyzing the country? Moreover, prolonging the war will allow the Iranian regime to boast even more about its survival. We survived a prolonged attack by a superpower and the world's best air force; they rained everything possible down on us. What more can they threaten us with?
Ending the war now does not mean that it achieved nothing. The 12-day war was not without achievements either. It is possible that the overwhelming military superiority demonstrated in that war, together with Iranian weakness, pushed the masses to take to the streets six months later. We can hope that even after the current war ends, the masses will try to exploit the regime's weakness and take to the streets.
The problem is that we have no real influence over when the war ends. Even if we did have such influence, it is doubtful that Netanyahu would push for an end. And the IDF, unfortunately, does not dare, under the pressure of the smear machine, to propose anything less forceful than what the political leadership wants. God forbid they should portray it as weak.