The rationale of decision-makers in Israel for the recent series of actions is as follows: They are not meant to bring about a decisive victory or remove the threat, but rather to force Hassan Nasrallah to sever the link he made on October 8th between Gaza and Lebanon. To sign a separate agreement with us and ignore the fact that there is no ceasefire agreement in Gaza. This is a just and important goal. In the negotiation we like to have with ourselves, I think we achieved an agreement. We exerted force, carried out a jaw-dropping operation, and now we are ready to get up from the table and realize the gains.
But what if Nasrallah is less willing to go along with the scenario we wrote for him, and because of the heavy blows he received, he also wants to hurt and come to the negotiating table from a slightly less weak position? Nasrallah’s ability to inflict damage is relatively easy to operate, does not depend on the thousands of fighters who were hit, and does not require the command skills of Ibrahim Aqil. Launching heavy rockets at major cities in Israel would change the equation immediately. Such a launch would put pressure on our decision-makers to enter, to "clean," "clear," "conquer" — the words we love so much.
We remember well how the last ground maneuvers in Lebanon ended. The entanglement in Maroun al-Ras, the bleeding in Bint Jbeil. Have the 18 years that passed completely changed the balance of power? Hopefully. The IDF demonstrated impressive ground maneuvering ability in Gaza, but we must also remember how it operated there. Crazy bombings and slow work. Weeks until the conquest of Beit Hanoun, a long time before daring to enter on foot and not in armored vehicles. We do not have that time now, and the IDF is not as fresh as it was at the start of the ground maneuver in Gaza.
The potential for entanglement here is huge. We cannot rely on Benjamin Netanyahu’s pragmatism, as is well known. His personal considerations override any other consideration. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has surprised positively in recent months, yet in the absurd situation created and with a heating-up successor on the sidelines, we cannot rely on his pragmatism either. For him, ending the war means losing his position.
At the start of the Second Lebanon War, a spectacular operation called "Density" was carried out, in which most of Hezbollah’s long-range missile capability was destroyed. There was an exceptional opportunity to close the story, but the success probably intoxicated the decision-makers. The operation was not even publicly announced, and the appetite for total victory caused entanglement.
The so-called "Pingers Operation" was born from the fact that it was about to be exposed. But alongside the significant benefits of the operation came considerable damage. Mainly because it caused Lebanese elements not counted among Hezbollah supporters to back a harsh response against Israel. If there had been any “handcuffs” on Nasrallah in recent years, they were the constraints of Lebanese public opinion. This operation is responsible for their weakening. Yet, now that the operation has already happened, it is Israel’s smartest opportunity to quickly push for a political settlement. We prepared, they responded, let’s end this. Let’s not return to the mistake of prolonging the Second Lebanon War.
If we learned anything from the Second Lebanon War — it is that we inflicted too much damage on ourselves. We did not understand that despite all the ground failures, the blows struck at Lebanon left a deep scar on Hezbollah; a scar largely responsible for almost 18 years of near-total quiet. It is likely that even if we end now without that impossible "victory" over Hezbollah, Nasrallah will be deterred for many years.
This is not certain, it might still deter some residents of the north from returning home, but it seems a far better scenario than all alternative scenarios, certainly more reasonable than entering Lebanon on the ground.