I do not share the harsh criticism of the opposition’s performance. It is clear that more could be done, but comparing it to Netanyahu’s monolithic bloc is unfair. The gap between Ben Gvir and Deri, Smotrich, and Barkat is much smaller than that between Odeh and Elkin. I do have one criticism: the fact that the opposition leaders cannot stand together and say, “A million things divide us, but one thing unites us — this government must go,” and from there operate a joint headquarters to topple the government.
Lapid has a not-bad answer to this criticism: if we stand on one stage, we will be doing Netanyahu’s work for him, as he wants to brand us all as leftists who hate him. Part of this answer stems not from a lack of will, but from a lack of ability. The ability of Liberman, Gantz, Bennett, and Lapid to unite as one fist will greatly affect the composition of the next government.
I assume that when elections are finally held, Netanyahu will not be considered a candidate to form a government. Polls have consistently shown this for nearly two years. It is hard to see a scenario in which the war ends in a way that helps him grow from it — on the contrary; right now, Netanyahu’s bloc numbers are flattered because many still see him as a wartime leader. Traditionally, during war, a prime minister’s numbers are much better than on the day after. When that day comes, disappointment will set in, and voters — especially right-wing ones who kept waiting for absolute victory — will flee.
After such election results, it is reasonable to think the ultra-Orthodox parties will not cling to Netanyahu. They will not agree to play the incitement-against-Arabs game or to force new elections when their budgets are at stake. This possibility could now create an arms race of courting the ultra-Orthodox — who will offer them more on conscription and stipends — and cause them to dismantle the government.
The four contenders for the crown understand the situation. Gantz is sure he is in the worst position. Lapid would prefer Bennett over him. Lapid, Bennett, and Liberman have improved harmony compared to Gantz’s relations with each of them. Conclusion: Gantz will be the first to chase the ultra-Orthodox and post-Netanyahu Likud. Much of what Gantz is doing today — the excessive compliments to Deri, attending Babchik’s wedding — stems from this.
Lapid and Liberman cannot approach the ultra-Orthodox. Their conclusion is clear: form a political alliance and act together in coalition negotiations. Right now, as before elections, the appearance of such an alliance would harm them greatly. Their voters would not like it. After elections, they could agree on a rotation for the premiership and act as a joint party, potentially worth 30 seats. To get close to the premiership, they will need Likud, Bennett, and Golan — not an easy feat.
Bennett, in this sense, is a bit of a loner. Lapid would indeed prefer him over Gantz, but would naturally prefer himself first — even as part of a rotation. He is expected to court Likud and the ultra-Orthodox, assuming that closeness in positions will foster forgiveness for past grudges.
All these complicated numbers games are meant to illustrate one thing: anyone speaking with civil servants in government ministries hears the same line — a longing for the days of the “change government.” Forget politics, the officials say — there was a sense of work, progress, focus.
To recreate that, to once again have a sane, reasonable government, the leaders of the Change Coalition must start coordinating now. It’s less important that they work together right now to topple Netanyahu — here the benefit of cooperation is smaller. It will matter more on the day after the elections. Then, a dramatic rise above ego will be required, of the kind they showed when forming the change government. It starts and ends with establishing the rule that will determine which of the four will be prime minister. If that agreement exists, everything else will fall into place accordingly.