During the first eight months of the war, the decision-makers had no real intention of launching a ground war in Lebanon. They threatened with bold statements like “Nasrallah will make the mistake of his life,” but for Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Galant, and the military leadership, it was clear there was no point in such a confrontation — it wouldn’t achieve results that couldn’t be attained diplomatically, and the price could be unbearably high.
In recent weeks, the situation has shifted somewhat. The humiliation inflicted by Hezbollah has become too heavy. Disruptions in the north, drone infiltrations, the exposure of Israeli vulnerabilities — Netanyahu struggles to tolerate this. Suddenly, a “cheap” war was born, no longer returning Lebanon to the Stone Age or conquering up to the Litani River. They talk about a limited ground maneuver, just a few kilometers, primarily to send a message to northern residents: the threat of a ground incursion like October 7 has been removed, return to your homes. The ceasefire agreement, essentially completed, also cannot be implemented. It was always conditional on arrangements in the south, which are nowhere in sight. The hostages deal has become impossible, and it seems we are heading for a war of attrition in Gaza, with the elusive hope that maybe one day Yahya Sinwar will fall into our hands and we can declare victory.
These factors are, for the first time, making a ground maneuver in the north feasible. This will be a bad decision. The situation is difficult and humiliating, but such a maneuver may worsen it. It is hard to see any benefit coming from it. The IDF spokesperson will announce the (real) heroism of the fighters, the elimination of terrorists, and the blowing up of bunkers, but at the end of the operation the IDF will not be established on the ground. No one will repeat the mistake of the security zone. Once it’s over, it will not be possible to truly claim the threat of a ground incursion has been completely removed. The parties will have to return to the ceasefire agreement already on the table.
An even more problematic issue: the damage to the Israeli home front may be painful but could also turn the “small” maneuver into a full-scale war. Israel will be forced to respond more forcefully to power outages and hits on strategic facilities. That response itself faces an almost impossible challenge. For years, senior IDF officials have threatened that a war with Hezbollah would destroy Lebanon, its electricity, water, and infrastructure facilities. Lebanon is Hezbollah, and Hezbollah is Lebanon. Given our current situation — with arrest warrants in The Hague, an unprecedented political tsunami, and isolation — can Israel bomb the infrastructure of this bankrupt state that the Western world clings to keep alive? And if we do, what justification will we have against Hezbollah’s damage to our strategic facilities, which may turn us into a risky state for foreign investment in the years to come?
It is very sad that Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz again do not dare publicly oppose this maneuver. This is a recurring, depressing pattern, especially with Gantz. Operation in Rafah? We wanted that first. Who is responsible for the crushing of the hostages deal? Hamas. This even goes back to Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal, pushed by Netanyahu and the overall attitude toward the agreement. Gantz is afraid of losing center-right votes and is losing a much more important asset: leadership.
What can be done in the north? There are no good options, but here is the least bad one: Israel unilaterally withdraws from Gaza while declaring the war on Hamas continues, reserving the right to return when deemed appropriate; reaching a ceasefire agreement in the north, and significantly strengthening protection of settlements and the northern and southern borders. Far from a “total victory,” but at least not a “total defeat,” which is the direction we are heading now.