It was a perfect trap for Mansour Abbas. The embodiment of all his concerns. A commitment to a Joint List, raising hands alongside Sami Abu Shehadeh of Balad. Abbas knows Israeli society well. He knew Likud would seize on that image and that he would receive no support from the other camp, which keeps a safe distance from him (apart from Yair Golan).
This was not intended to be a trap. It was an important and inspiring civic event. Tens of thousands of members of Arab society finally took to the streets, to Sakhnin, to speak out against the government's appalling indifference to the massacre in Arab society. One of Sakhnin's courageous residents, a business owner facing threats from criminal organizations, translated that rare energy into a declaration of a joint effort to establish a Joint List. No principles, no placements, no leader, but there is a strong public desire for such a list to be established, along with several sophisticated people who were clever enough to turn the declaration and the joint photograph into media headlines claiming that the Joint List had already been reestablished — as if this were the end of the process rather than barely its beginning.
If a Joint List is indeed established, the event in Sakhnin may come to be regarded as one of the events that determined the outcome of the election. According to the polls, establishing a Joint List would lead to several things: increased turnout among Arab citizens — the Arab parties would rise from around 10–12 seats separately to around 13–15 seats or even more. In that case, the almost certain result is that the Change bloc would have no chance of reaching 61 seats. If it currently reaches 56–61 seats in various polls (excluding Shlomo Filber's polls on Channel 14), it is expected to lose two or three seats. The implication: Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman would have to retract their inflammatory declarations and form a government based on the abstention of several Arab MKs. Incidentally, Arab parties have recently become more willing to do things that were not done in the past in order to enable such a government. Ra'am has always been there, but even Tibi's Ta'al and perhaps even Hadash will do almost anything to remove Netanyahu.
There is another implication: the Netanyahu bloc, which stands at 49–52 seats, would also lose two or three seats. If the bloc received only 49–46 seats, would the ultra-Orthodox parties still remain committed to Netanyahu? Would Netanyahu remain in that position, or would he step aside and allow Likud to join the government?
Abbas is navigating his political moves with the aim of preserving room for maneuver to enter a coalition. A Joint List is a significant problem for him. It ties him to Balad and several Hadash MKs, making it harder for Lieberman and Bennett to embrace him again. Abbas is smart enough to understand that the public sentiment that emerged in Sakhnin will now be difficult to suppress over issues such as the placement of MKs on the list or who will head it. On the other hand, he will demand that the price of joining be giving him more MKs in realistic positions. If he has 6–7 MKs, it will be easier for him to provide the 61st seat for the Change bloc.
The leaders of the Change bloc were far from pleased with the picture in Sakhnin, to put it mildly. From Bennett's perspective, if elections could be held without Arab parties at all, that would be preferable. Among the Jewish parties, the Change bloc has a solid majority according to the polls. Well, Bennett and his colleagues will have to accept the fact that Arab society will probably receive fairly substantial representation; Netanyahu and his colleagues will not try to suppress turnout there, because they understand this as well. Instead of fantasizing, Bennett and Lieberman would be better off developing a smarter campaign strategy as quickly as possible for this scenario. Continuing to scatter empty promises, along the lines of "We'll form a government without the ultra-Orthodox and without Arabs," will not work.