The most embarrassing minister of all is Bezalel Smotrich. In an interview on “Zman Emet” on the Kan public broadcaster, he said that he “conceived the idea to eliminate Nasrallah.” Yet in the meeting itself that discussed the matter, two days earlier, he opposed it. Smotrich was also not present at the second major attack on Iran. The phrase he liked to say in the cabinet was that he did not have enough data to make a decision.
Smotrich likes to send letters. In one letter, he recommended to the Prime Minister a “10/10” — meaning that the policy should be to hold a 10-kilometer security strip in the north for ten years. That makes sense. In a second letter, he recommended doubling the force deployment in Judea and Samaria to reduce the nightmare scenario of a terrorist invasion of the settlements. Also reasonable. In a third letter, he recommended imposing military rule on the Gaza Strip. Smotrich has never explained exactly where the army for all these reasonable missions would come from; after all, he is just the Finance Minister.
Benjamin Netanyahu deserves full credit for the knockout delivered to Hezbollah. It wasn’t done according to a plan; it unfolded by itself. The army, Unit 8200, and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi deserve great credit for the initiative, intelligence gathering, and execution, but ultimately Netanyahu is responsible for all the decisions.
Some of Netanyahu’s retrospective stories create the impression that he has somewhat lost it — not only in hindsight, but in real time. Netanyahu told, for example, to Gadi Taub about the operation to eliminate Hezbollah’s launchers and missiles. “I was presented with three options,” he said. “None seemed right to me, so I erased them all and requested a fourth option.” The army managed to develop that fourth option in 48 hours and, according to him, executed it “wonderfully.”
Well, the truth is that the army indeed presented three options. For one of them, Netanyahu was told there was an additional part to be carried out if the right intelligence was received. Netanyahu theatrically erased all three options, took a board, and wrote exactly that same option on it — including the part dependent on intelligence. In other words, these are not just invented stories told in hindsight; it was a theatrical act in real time, which already sows the seeds for the invented history.
So much energy is wasted on these credit wars. Unfortunately, this energy is inversely proportional to the resources invested in trying not to miss the exceptional political opportunities that have arisen vis-à-vis Lebanon and Syria. In Israel, they rushed to brand Ahmad al-Sharaa, the new leader of Syria, as a jihadist in a suit. What exactly is the damage to Israel if it tries to push for dialogue with al-Sharaa? To reach some agreements? Maybe it will turn out to be just a disguise, but there is also the opposite possibility: al-Sharaa is exploring the possibility of becoming something else. But if all Western doors close to him, he will return to the jihadist starting point. It will certainly be easier for us that way.
There is also a huge opportunity in Lebanon. What is happening there has not occurred in the last 40 years. What is Israel doing to strengthen anti-Hezbollah forces in Lebanon besides bombing and assassinating? Is there not a single person in the Israeli leadership who would push for concessions in negotiations over the border line with Lebanon to try to reach a quick agreement with them?
Israel’s political capacity has deteriorated in recent years. There is no real Foreign Ministry, no National Security Council, no Foreign Minister — there is only Ron Dermer. The war in the Gaza Strip makes it difficult to create international alliances. Who wants to cooperate with a country that does what we do in Gaza?
Here is the real credit story: the security establishment delivered fantastic operations; the role of the political echelon is to translate them into a new political reality. And no one wants to enter this credit war.