President Donald Trump is far removed from the motivations many here attribute to him. He doesn’t genuinely care about the fate of the hostages. He has no real problem with Israel continuing the war in Gaza — as long as it doesn’t demand his attention, which is currently focused on the systematic destruction of every decent institution in the U.S. and around the world. What he does care about is the Nobel Peace Prize. He assumes that a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia would guarantee him a ticket to Oslo. A $1 trillion Saudi investment in the U.S. isn’t a bad incentive either.
This ambition is what shapes Trump’s policy regarding the second phase of the hostage deal. One of the two conditions the Saudis have set for an agreement with Israel is calm in Gaza. Trump needs to convince the Saudis that if they wait for permanent calm, there will never be a deal. In other words, it’s better to settle for an open-ended ceasefire and not blow up the agreement over an IDF targeted assassination in southern Gaza or a localized ground operation in the north.
This is something Netanyahu might go along with: extending the ceasefire beyond Day 42, continuing negotiations, and splitting Phase B into two or more stages. If Phase A is fully completed, 59 hostages will remain in Hamas captivity — 35 of them declared dead, and 24 presumed alive — 22 of whom are Israeli. Netanyahu can offer Trump “Phase B1”: the release of some of the hostages, which would also require categorizing them, just like in Phase A. The four soldiers — sadly — would be pushed to the end. Hostages from the Nova music festival and residents of southern Israel would be released first. In exchange, Israel would conduct a partial withdrawal, leaving the IDF mainly in the perimeter. Instead of releasing the most senior terror convicts, Israel would free prisoners of a slightly lower tier. Netanyahu would try to sell Trump on the idea that this should be enough for the Saudis. It could deliver months of quiet in Gaza, and in the meantime, the normalization deal would be signed. To his coalition partners, Netanyahu would say: “Let’s achieve this historic breakthrough together, wait a few months, and then resume the fight against Hamas.”
This outline is driven purely by political and coalitionary calculations. A far better approach would be to sign a comprehensive, swift deal — release all the hostages, withdraw within a week, and strike a deal with Saudi Arabia. As IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reportedly said in a cabinet meeting a year ago: no one will stop us from resuming the fight later. Imagine that two months after such a deal is implemented, Israel detects a Hamas buildup — or simply spots an opportunity to eliminate Mohammed Sinwar. Would anyone in the world really object to Israel taking such action? Would the Saudis blow up the agreement?
Saudi Arabia’s second demand only highlights the dangerous entanglement within Netanyahu’s current coalition. The Saudis are insisting on a pathway to a Palestinian state — a deliberately vague term meant to lay the groundwork for a credible process that would ultimately lead to Palestinian statehood. Another prime minister, heading a different coalition, would likely embrace the demand wholeheartedly, open negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, enable its reentry into the Gaza Strip, and condition the establishment of a Palestinian state on terms that would be seen as reasonable and legitimate by most of the Western world.
Netanyahu, by contrast, would struggle to push through any agreement containing the forbidden words “Palestinian state” in his coalition — even if they were phrased in a convoluted or absurd way, as in Trump’s ludicrous plan during his previous term.
Trump’s upcoming meeting with Netanyahu will undoubtedly feature all the customary signs of affection — and that, in itself, is no small matter. As much as one can predict the behavior of a U.S. president who is now slapping tariffs on Canada and waging a vile purge campaign within the FBI, he’s likely to shower Netanyahu with praise. But it’s doubtful that he’ll have much patience for Netanyahu’s trademark foot-dragging.
Still, Trump has already missed the deadline for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. He’s got some time left to aim for next year’s.