We’ve returned to the comfort zone: “Hamas is to blame,” “Hamas responded negatively.” At least that’s how the “political source” briefs it. It’s true that in February Hamas agreed to a deal on more favorable terms; and it’s true that it has since hardened its positions. But why did Israel say “no” in February to Hamas’s proposal?
The original sin, of course, was Benjamin Netanyahu’s refusal to allow armed forces of the Palestinian Authority, backed by Arab and international support, into the northern Gaza Strip on the basis of a willingness to resume political negotiations. Netanyahu left the area in a vacuum, against all recommendations from the IDF, the Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, and the Americans. The fear of Ben Gvir and Smotrich was greater.
Even if two unnecessary months passed before Israel softened its stance, it’s worth examining whether Hamas’s response is really the resounding “no” portrayed here by interested parties. First, we are rightly shocked that Hamas talks about 20 living hostages out of the 40 listed. The “disappearance” of 20 hostages understandably causes anger, but Hamas never claimed that all 40 “humanitarian” hostages are alive and under its control. This was a negotiation with ourselves, and now we’re disappointed that reality doesn’t match our expectations.
In fact, Israel’s estimates are not much different from the number Hamas cited. More importantly: if this is indeed the number of living hostages, wouldn’t it be better to make a deal for them now instead of waiting until the number diminishes further? Second, Hamas demands an IDF withdrawal from city centers. What’s the problem? We are not in most city centers anyway, and nothing prevents us from returning after the deal.
Why is the Mossad managing the negotiations? This wasn’t the case in the past. The reason, a senior cabinet official claimed, is simply that the Mossad chief reports directly to Netanyahu.
Third, Hamas demands the possibility for every Gazan to return to their home. This is not an easy demand, but in the absence of any foreseeable governing alternative, they will return to their homes eventually — unless someone dreams of establishing settlements on the ruins of Gaza City. The “political source” reported that Hamas wants a link between phase A, the humanitarian stage of the deal, and phase B, which leads to the end of the war. As far as is known, this is not a condition for starting the deal. Israel could, after the first phase, return to fighting if it even knows what it wants to achieve, beyond prolonging Netanyahu’s rule for a few more months.
Indeed, Hamas’s demands have hardened, but the real question is whether this is a good deal for Israel — and the answer is a resounding “yes.” It is certainly much better than the alternative, for the simple reason that there is no alternative. Israel’s entire strategy rests on executing a deal, a pause to regroup and clarify what we want in Gaza, and regulating the situation in the north. Surprisingly, the understandings toward a northern arrangement agreement are progressing far more than it seems. It’s already at the paperwork stage: an agreement between Lebanon and Israel under U.S. mediation. It’s hard to know if Hezbollah truly agreed, but without a ceasefire in the south, completing the process will be difficult.
A senior cabinet official aired criticism quietly, which is often heard in closed rooms. Why exactly is the Mossad managing the negotiations? This wasn’t the case in the past. In the Gilad Shalit deal, it was the head of the Shin Bet and the special coordinator. The reason, the official said, is simply that the Mossad chief reports directly to Netanyahu, and Netanyahu feels comfortable with him.