Years after the end of the Second Lebanon War, I interviewed the defense minister during that war, Amir Peretz. “Anyone who thinks they achieved a victory effect at a certain point in time in a particular event is wrong,” he said. “It’s amazing to see that the most heroic and significant operations — last 48 hours, and then become routine.” Peretz was referring to how quickly the impact of the operation faded at the start of that war, when Hezbollah’s “Fajr” rockets hidden in residential apartments were eliminated. The thought naturally shifts to the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures. Amazing achievements, but if they are not quickly translated into a different reality on the ground — they will wear out and vanish.
After the war, it will be fascinating to understand what caused the unfathomable gap between the capabilities attributed to Hezbollah for years and its actual capabilities in this conflict. From the prime minister to the last journalist, Hezbollah was portrayed as an organization that could shut off our power, disable vital services, destroy most air force bases, and topple residential towers. Confronting it was perceived as madness.
Until the assassination of Fuad Shukr, the “Hezbollah chief of staff,” it seemed the organization simply did not want to deploy its power. Since the assassination, it appears the capabilities are far from what was imagined. Where is the ability to launch 2,500–3,000 missiles at once? Where are the precise missiles that would be launched together, so that just five passing Israel’s air defenses would cause unprecedented damage to the home front?
The two explanations given so far are unconvincing. The IDF’s activity is impressive and intense, but a terrorist army of tens of thousands of fighters and hundreds of thousands of rockets should be able to organize such a powerful day of launching, even if 50% of its capabilities have been reduced and communication is difficult. The other explanation, that Iran did not give permission for this type of war, is also weak. Iran fired about 200 ballistic missiles at Israel to respond to an Israeli operation against Hezbollah, even though it was always claimed it would be the other way around: Hezbollah would respond forcefully to an Israeli strike on Iran.
Maybe we were mistaken in describing Hezbollah’s capabilities? Perhaps this is another round of the unconventional weapons that were supposed to be in Iraq? The important point is that even in the current state of affairs, it is difficult to see how clear military superiority translates into a better reality in the foreseeable future. In the interview, Peretz also said: whoever looks for a victory image in the struggle against a terrorist organization will not find one. Because in the end, the last barrel held by the last link will manage to fire a missile proving the organization is alive and well.
Assuming the most positive scenario: Hezbollah continues “only” with current launches, Israel continues to strike, and the ground operation progresses successfully. Will all this bring the point where northern residents return to their homes? Even the current launches are not a reality anyone can come to terms with. Moreover, the IDF will leave the Shiite villages at some point. Without a political solution, who exactly will enter there?
For Benjamin Netanyahu, a ground operation that lasts weeks is a blessing; it enables survival, no state inquiry commission is established when our brave soldiers are in southern Lebanon, and of course, soon his defense lawyers will file a request to postpone in the Jerusalem district court. How can he testify amid such an intense war? A powerful response in Iran, which will only escalate the situation, also suits him. For the public, however, the response leverage in Iran and Hezbollah’s weakness could have been used now to try to reach a ceasefire agreement that would disconnect between the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, push Hezbollah away, and create a more effective multinational force to enter the area.