About five months ago, during a security discussion, Benjamin Netanyahu referred to leaving the Netzarim corridor, which cuts the Gaza Strip in two between north and south. “If we leave it, it’s our defeat in the war. We lost,” he said. At that time, the Chief of Staff also opposed withdrawing from the corridor, and the hostage deal was shelved—precisely when Hamas presented flexible positions. In May, the Chief of Staff changed his stance, as did the Defense Minister. Under heavy pressure, Netanyahu approved a new framework, including withdrawal from the corridor. Before doing so, he went around the table to ensure everyone supported it, that no one was blocking him from the right.
In May, Hamas hardened its position again, and once more the two trains passed without meeting. Now Netanyahu hates this framework—perhaps because Hamas has again softened its stance. Netanyahu claims senior defense officials “imposed” the framework on him, and he returns to demanding an Israeli presence in the corridor, knowing it would topple the deal. This time, the Chief of Staff is trying to present a different position, publicly saying the army can meet any condition of a deal and that a deal must be reached—but his public weight is no longer strong enough.
Netanyahu dismisses these statements lightly. This is just one example of a deepening problem: the military leadership has not relinquished the keys and has not allowed other entities, free of the “hunchback” of October 7th, to make decisions.
Another striking example relates to the fighting in Rafah. Netanyahu paints a picture of Hamas on the brink of defeat because we entered Rafah despite all warnings, won, killed, and defeated. The army knows well we never truly entered Rafah city, that four Hamas brigades there were not dismantled; they took a hit, retreated, and are waiting for an opportunity to strike back when they detect vulnerabilities on our side.
The problem is that the IDF cooperates with this misleading narrative. It also talks about signs of breaking Hamas’s power, claiming two brigades in Rafah were wiped out and the others fled. The military leadership shares an interest with Netanyahu in portraying a big victory. For them, this is partly atonement for October 7th, and more importantly: justification for the Chief of Staff’s position that a hostage deal is necessary. “See, we won, we can fold up.”
Netanyahu’s and the hard right’s attack on the army is so cruel and ugly that the initial instinct is to defend the military at all costs. Between the cynicism of Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir and the professionalism and integrity of Razi Halevi and Ronen Bar in the Shin Bet, choosing a side isn’t hard. Yet, lately, it has become difficult to defend the IDF.
Why conduct the “Barry” investigation first and publish only that? Because the army wants to clear Brigadier General Barak Hiram and enable him to command the Gaza Division. This does not justify a situation where the first IDF investigation criticizes the Sayeret Matkal team and its commander but ignores all senior commanders and the responsibility of intelligence, the operations division, and the Gaza Division. This is a clear case of favoritism.
The handling of the ultra-Orthodox recruitment issue raises even more questions. The head of Manpower Directorate skipped the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meeting twice, and when he attended, the IDF’s answers were halting and incomplete. Meanwhile, more and more videos of reservists expressing political views during combat are surfacing, setting policy, voicing opinions “contrary to IDF values”—and no one in the army can stop them. As if it were a militia, not a professional army.
Not all of this should be laid on the heavy shoulders of Halevi—but the explanations of a Chief of Staff without a “hunchback” would be listened to much more attentively.