President Joe Biden did it brilliantly. On Friday night, before the crazies here woke up, by rallying support among European allies — French President Emmanuel Macron even tweeted in Hebrew out of excitement — by persuading the mediators to back it, by marketing the proposal as an Israeli initiative on the one hand, yet branding it “end of the war” on the other, so that Hamas would indirectly receive the guarantee it wanted, namely that the U.S. would not allow Israel to resume fighting. Perfect. That “perfect” move sent Netanyahu’s office into hysteria. Netanyahu disregarded the ultra-Orthodox, issued two distancing statements on Saturday, sent a “senior official” to brief the press, and began anxiously counting stars in the sky.
The proposal now before Israel serves our interests well. It’s not new, but it’s even more attractive after we lost part of the leverage tied to “we’ll enter Rafah.” Whoever frames it as a tradeoff between hostages and the collapse of Hamas is living in the reality of October–December 2023. Now it’s hostages + normalization with Saudi Arabia + an arrangement in the north + economic recovery + a necessary pause for the IDF — versus, on the other side, a war of attrition whose outcome is neither eliminating Hamas nor neutralizing Hezbollah, but a painful realization of the limits of power (despite the fiery speeches of the “strategic geniuses” Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich).
Nevertheless, there isn’t a single person in Israel’s leadership who believes Netanyahu will agree. Everyone knows the rope he gave this proposal stemmed only from his confidence that Hamas would reject it. As Hamas delays rejection, Netanyahu makes sure a Hamas “no” will come, by declaring the certainty of renewed fighting.
In this context, it’s disappointing to see how Netanyahu has once again managed to intimidate the Israeli political system — even his strongest opponents — from voicing a different position. Much like the deafening silence of Israel’s leadership when Netanyahu pushed Donald Trump to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, which brought Iran within reach of the bomb. Even now Naftali Bennett is silent, Avigdor Lieberman talks only about the draft law, Aryeh Deri says nothing, and Benny Gantz waited until Saturday night and eventually published a statement that was three-quarters “yes” and one-quarter “no.” Gantz’s statement apparently forced Gadi Eisenkot — the most courageous and clear-minded figure in this war — into silence too. The only one who spoke in favor was Yair Lapid. Some will say he has nothing to lose, but I’m willing to give him credit for simply understanding that some issues matter even more than your polling numbers.
This week — perhaps even tomorrow — the National Unity party will leave the government. It won’t shake the coalition, but it is time for a short and painful conclusion. I was among those who thought Gantz did the right thing by joining, and even now I believe that in the situation after October 7 he had no choice but to enter. But in the same breath, it must be said that in the test of outcomes it did not turn out well. I don’t deny that Gantz and Eisenkot had a moderating and positive influence at several key points, but after eight months one cannot ignore the harsh result of the war’s management: an unprecedented anti-Israel diplomatic tsunami, deteriorating relations with the U.S., Egypt, and Jordan, a sense of existential insecurity across wide areas of the country, an abandoned north, a declining economy, a neglected south, Hamas still standing, Hezbollah functioning, and 125 hostages still in Hamas captivity.
All that’s left is to play “what if.” What if Lapid had coordinated his proposal to join the government with Gantz on October 7, and together they had presented Netanyahu with a unified demand: we enter if you remove Ben Gvir and Smotrich. Had that happened, perhaps we would be in a completely different situation today.