The most problematic demand from Hamas is the identity of the “heavy” prisoners to be released in the deal. Israel cannot agree to this, and Hamas knows it. They remember the negotiations in the Gilad Shalit deal, when a similar arrangement was raised and resolved through a joint determination of who would be released. Hamas submitted lists, Israel deleted and returned them, Hamas insisted, Israel hesitated—this issue caused repeated explosions in the talks.
A Western source close to the mediators told me that Hamas does not intend at this stage to demand the release of the most notorious prisoners—the architects of the Second Intifada, militants responsible for the deaths of dozens of Israelis. Simply naming them would be a declaration that the organization does not want the agreement. Assuming these names are not raised, the issue is solvable. The price will be painful, Hamas will gain prestige, but the benefit for Israel will be far greater. Speed is critical here; there is no time for months of negotiation over names—a fast, efficient mechanism is needed.
The second demand Israel struggles with is the return of Palestinian residents to northern Gaza. Israel has agreed to the return of women and children, as well as men who are not of fighting age. Hamas wants everyone to return. Some in Israel portray this as a loss in the war: residents of the surrounding communities won’t return, and Hamas will regain control of Gaza. This is exaggerated. Israel has an interest in a situation where residents leave Rafah and return to their homes for clear reasons. Control mechanisms can also be created to monitor who returns; they won’t be perfect, but Israel cannot prevent northern Gaza from being inhabited. The issue is only the timing of the return.
In war cabinet discussions, Yoav Gallant often teases the Prime Minister, saying that without a cabinet decision, he raised the price per hostage. In the previous deal, 10 hostages equaled one day of truce; now it’s one day per hostage. Yet this truce does not necessarily work against Israel. The IDF needs it to prepare for continued operations and to stabilize the situation in the north. The numerical “cost” of the security prisoners to be released is tolerable. Israel has detained roughly 4,000 security prisoners since October 7. Releasing 800–900 (without the “heavyweights”) would help Itamar Ben Gvir distance himself from his major failure as Minister of National Security, unable even to prepare sufficient detention space for those Israel has arrested.
Officials involved in the deal—though not necessarily political figures—say in private that if the Prime Minister tries to undermine a good deal, they will speak out. This is not a small promise. Benjamin Netanyahu understands that his maneuvering room is limited. Public statements like “Hamas’ demands are ridiculous” are a legitimate opening position for negotiations—but discarding the deal would be a crime, no less.
The collapse of the previous deal was fueled in large part by repeated statements from Netanyahu and Gallant, nearly daily, that “we’ll return to fighting any moment now.” This likely had heavy costs. Hamas entered the previous deal assuming it would evolve from a temporary ceasefire to a permanent one. Repeated statements from the Prime Minister and Defense Minister signaled that it was better to keep the hostages for the next round of negotiations.
Hamas made concessions in its response to the Paris framework: no longer demanding a permanent ceasefire or the full withdrawal of the IDF from day one. Still, it included elements in its response intended to turn a six-week truce into a permanent ceasefire. Israel does not have to agree to this, but there is also no need to announce every day that it is only temporary, even if it costs Netanyahu half a percentage point in the next poll.