After a month or two of a ground maneuver, that word resurfaces again: “stagnation.” Various IDF representatives were appalled—just don’t start saying “stagnation.” This 18-year-old trauma is still there. In the Second Lebanon War, 34 days in, the word began to take hold in TV studios and newspapers. How impatient we were then—after two and a half weeks it already felt like “stagnation.” This time, with infinite patience, we are truly stagnating, certainly over the past month. Even the army admits it, albeit half-heartedly.
The reason is connected to the original plan submitted by the IDF and approved by the cabinet: a year-long operation in three stages. In phase C, the current phase, the allocated forces cannot do more than what they are currently doing. The operation in Khan Yunis has already lasted three months. Without belittling the achievements, the siege of Beirut lasted two months. In recent weeks, frustration on the ground and at the military top has been enormous. There is a bottleneck. There aren’t enough forces to start operations in the central camps, certainly not in Rafah, but there is also no hostage deal that enforces a ceasefire. Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot know they may have erred in approving the IDF’s endless plan. Such a plan is not designed for a modern, Western state that wants to restore its citizens to normal life. This is a plan whose pace suits Hamas, and also a prime minister who wants an endless war.
Now an internal political battle is unfolding over the hostage deal. The leaks speak of a hardening in Hamas’s position. Yahya Sinwar, who until recently said he needed a deal by Ramadan, suddenly wants war during Ramadan. The leaks supposedly rely on intelligence sources who are always skilled at interpreting Sinwar’s intentions. Someone is conditioning public opinion to reject the deal’s framework.
The truth is somewhat different. Hamas has stepped back from its toughest demand—which stalled negotiations for the past three months—that the deal begin with Israel committing to stop fighting and quickly withdraw from the Strip. True, alongside stepping back from this demand, Hamas wants a premium for each component of the Paris framework. Not a 10-to-1 ratio of prisoners for hostages released, but a much higher ratio—maybe 20-to-1, maybe more. Not 15 “heavy” prisoners, but many more. Not merely withdrawal from city centers, but a broader pullback. And not just the return of women, children, and the elderly to northern Gaza—but also men.
These demands are tough for Israel. Yet, bottom line: if this is the deal on the table—40 Israeli hostages, including five female soldiers (hopefully all still alive) in exchange for 800 security prisoners, including 30 “heavy” prisoners with blood on their hands, and a broader return to northern Gaza—won’t Israel take it? The price paid in the Gilad Shalit deal was much higher. We must agree to such a deal.
Benjamin Netanyahu understands the situation he will face if this is the bottom line of discussions in Cairo. He knows that all the ministers in the war cabinet are in agreement on this, even the militant Yoav Galant and the loyal Ron Dermer. They too, like Aryeh Deri, Gantz, and Eizenkot, think a deal is necessary. The IDF also wants the deal; it needs a pause. But such a deal will undermine Netanyahu’s most important task—keeping the coalition alive, which includes Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Perhaps for this reason, Netanyahu suddenly invents new conditions, like receiving the names of living hostages before any deal. For now, this condition exists only in the media; no one has genuinely demanded it. Is this Netanyahu’s way of preserving his coalition until the moment of truth, only to accept the deal in the end?