Shimon Peres was the subject of much ridicule for opposing the bombing of the Iraqi reactor. When you delve into the arguments on both sides of that dispute, it’s somewhat frightening to realize there’s a chance that at the time Peres was arguably right. The risks were greater than the chances, but the risk did not materialize, and the operation that Menachem Begin led became one of the most successful Israel has ever conducted.
It’s unclear why last week the Mossad chief, David Barnea, found it important to publicly say that the Prime Minister decided in favor of the “alarm operation” (Mivtza HaBiparim), contrary to the prevailing school of thought in the discussion. Perhaps he actually wanted to say, “The Prime Minister and I led the operation.” Here too, when you examine the arguments of both sides of the debate—at the time, the opponents’ considerations, mainly the Chief of Staff’s, sounded no less compelling, perhaps even more so.
In this debate, there is a question that the public remains somewhat in the dark about: how great was the risk of exposing the alarms? It’s clear that if the entire operation was about to be exposed, the decision would shift toward activating them. Excluding this consideration, activating the alarms when it was done was disconnected from context. Israel did not decide to enter a campaign against Hezbollah; the assessment of Hezbollah’s response capabilities at that time was that there was a possibility the conflict could escalate to extreme levels, “wasting” an enormous card that had been built up brilliantly over the years. One can understand the army’s position.
A personal note: even before the alarm operation, I wrote here in favor of a ceasefire in the north. We waged a war of attrition without a clear goal, while giving Hezbollah a huge achievement in the form of paralyzing the north. In hindsight, it’s clear it was good that we didn’t make the ceasefire. Our current situation in the north is far better than the ceasefire that would have happened then. In my defense, senior and important figures acted in favor of such a ceasefire. First and foremost was Prime Minister Netanyahu, senior officials warning against getting entangled with Hezbollah (“towers will fall in Tel Aviv”), Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, and army chiefs. In fact, the only thing preventing an agreement with Hezbollah was Hezbollah’s refusal, conditioning the ceasefire in the north on a ceasefire in the south.
As part of reconstructing the historical narrative, all the heroes of that drama are now clinging to some kind of Hollywood script, each senior official to his own script. Netanyahu led a planned campaign against Hezbollah despite all the opposition in the army and cabinet. Nonsense. Each of the actions that changed the situation in the north was isolated, without any coherent logic, without prior intent, and built on what usually drives decision-making in Israel—seizing an opportunity.
The success of the alarm operation instilled great confidence among Israel’s leadership; it was accompanied by surprise at Hezbollah’s weak response and the success of the “Half the North” operation, which damaged Hezbollah’s missile capabilities. At this stage, fantastic intelligence arrived, requiring a quick decision regarding a series of assassinations of senior Hezbollah figures, primarily Nasrallah. A handful of confidants knew that we could have assassinated Nasrallah on many previous occasions, but we were afraid. Again, there were warnings in the army about disastrous consequences, but Gallant and Chief of Staff Hazi Halevi were on board from the start. Netanyahu was too, but he hesitated until the opportunity was nearly lost.
In the coming years, the sprouts of the credit battles will turn into a saga. My small personal lesson is: always remember how much you don’t know, especially as a journalist. By the way, even cabinet ministers were not aware of the alarm operation, the communication devices, and had no idea about the wonderful intelligence we had on Nasrallah. Would I think differently about a ceasefire in July 2025 if I knew we had these capabilities? The truth is, I have no idea.