They need to announce that they’re going home. Everyone. The Chief of Staff, the head of Shin Bet, the head of Aman, the Southern Command general, the Gaza Division commander. A flood of announcements. Not tomorrow morning, because they don’t abandon their posts. They take responsibility, notify the army and the political echelon that replacements will be sought, and over a few months the security leadership will be replaced. Dan Halutz announced his resignation five months after the end of the Second Lebanon War, and stayed in office another month until Gabi Ashkenazi took over. In this case— as long as it depends on Benjamin Netanyahu— the war will continue indefinitely, so there’s no reason to keep waiting. Their staying in position causes more harm than good.
Take the small example of Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfus. Why did he say what he said? Why did he dare bypass the IDF spokesman and the Chief of Staff? Because the top brass lost their authority; the cover-up can no longer be hidden. We need a military leadership that has no problem standing up to the Prime Minister and saying loudly: a hostages deal must be done. Not just because of the hostages, although that alone is reason enough, but also to allow the IDF to reorganize, align our relations with the U.S., bring normalization with Saudi Arabia, and reach an arrangement in the north.
This is the logical step, and everyone sitting in the war cabinet has understood it for a long time, but Netanyahu is stubborn, Yoav Galant follows his interests, and the security leadership lacks the ability to fully express its position. Don’t buy the nonsense Netanyahu sells about consensus in the war cabinet, as if “only Gadi Eizenkot thinks differently.” The picture is different: tough confrontations, and people tearing their hair out over the Prime Minister’s lack of focus.
On Saturday, Netanyahu managed to get the head of the Mossad to issue a statement supporting his position that it’s all Hamas and its rigid positions. For the Mossad chief, this was fine—a legitimate pressure on Hamas during negotiations—but Netanyahu uses each such statement to suppress the discussion about a deal and create the impression that nothing can be achieved, and not because of him. The picture, again, is the opposite: Hamas no longer demands a full ceasefire and a complete withdrawal from day one of the deal. This remains an aspiration for negotiations, but it no longer breaks the balance. The demand to release about 1,000 prisoners, including a few dozen murderers, is dreadful, but the price is lower than what Israel paid for a single soldier, without the dividends this deal should bring.
The argument against the resignation of the heads of the security apparatus is that Netanyahu will choose their replacements. Who will he choose? Let’s say Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir is appointed Chief of Staff—is that not suitable? Moreover, there’s public opinion, the government, and the appointments committee along the way. Yossi Sheli could be the chief statistician, but even Sarah Netanyahu wouldn’t suggest him as head of Shin Bet.
Another argument: the security leadership failed badly, but also asked the Prime Minister—stop. In the months before October 7, this already became a scream. Therefore, it’s unlikely that its members will pay the price while Netanyahu remains in office. There is some justice in that, but the way to lead Netanyahu home actually passes through his staying alone at the top. Even on the right, even among the most pro-Netanyahu, there is one strong message: everyone must pay the price. That’s why Netanyahu is the first to want the senior security officials to remain, a perfect shield against criticism of him. He’s the first to understand how much damage would be done if they resign.